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Introduction 
Homelessness remains a major social justice and economic issue in America 
today. One of the most effective solutions to this injustice is supportive housing, which 
combines long-term shelter with the provision of social services targeted to the 
homeless individual or family. Unfortunately, despite its obvious advantages, supportive 
housing remains controversial for ideological and political reasons. The first part of this 
analysis will be devoted to illustrating the extent of the homelessness problem in 
America and particularly the state of Georgia. Additionally, it will establish that 
supportive housing offers an extremely effective, socially equitable and economically 
efficient way to rehabilitate homeless individuals. Regrettably, the investment in 
supportive housing lags behind the demand for shelter and services, and Georgia is no 
exception to this rule. Furthermore, the extent and geography of homelessness in 
Georgia calls for vigorous state intervention to address the problem, but the political will 
for such action appears lacking at this moment.  
The primary goal of this paper is to recommend a policy framework that would 
enable the state of Georgia to have a substantive impact in this important arena. To this 
end, I present four sources of possible inspiration for a Georgia supportive housing 
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financing model. The New York/New York III agreement between the state and city of 
New York is given the most attention, but other groundbreaking state programs in North 
Carolina, Connecticut, and California are also investigated. As a part of my analysis, I 
suggest how the experiences from these states could be transferred into a viable 
scheme for implementation in Georgia.  
Homelessness 
Homelessness has emerged over the past few decades as one of the most 
pervasive issues in social policy. In almost every major metropolitan area in this 
country, the demand for homeless services far exceeds resources, and many cities 
have seen tremendous increases in homelessness over the past few years as housing 
affordability issues were followed by a recession that further marginalized poor and 
vulnerable Americans (The U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2008). Homelessness is not, 
however, merely an urban issue: The Council for Rural and Affordable Housing 
estimates that nine percent of the country’s homeless are in rural areas, where services 
remain skeletal, if they exist at all (National Coalition for the Homeless, 2009).  
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Figure 1: Causes of Homelessness 
 
 
As Figure 1 suggests, homelessness may have several causes. The prevalence 
of homelessness is best described by a risk function, where factors can influence the 
likelihood that someone will wind up in a situation where he or she is without a home. 
Poverty is a major risk factor. Quigley and Raphael (2001) found that the occurrence of 
homelessness is overwhelmingly a product of economic conditions in a metropolitan 
area, with the only noneconomic variable being winter temperature. They found that six 
factors (among them average rents and the unemployment rate) could explain over 97 
percent of the variance in homelessness between American metro areas. They 
concluded that modest investments in affordable housing or poverty alleviation would 
significantly bring down homelessness. 
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However, while poverty is clearly a macro-level driver of homelessness it can only 
explain part of the likelihood that an individual becomes homeless. Especially 
chronically homeless individuals often display a number of other characteristics, 
depicted on the left side of Figure 1. Arguably, issues such as family violence, mental 
illness, substance abuse etc. contribute significantly to poverty risk, but it is important to 
understand that these factors also directly influence risk of homelessness by weakening 
the mental ability of the individual to deal with life crises such as loss of employment or 
major health problems (Georgia Department of Community Affairs, 2009). 
Defining Supportive Housing 
Supportive housing is a relatively new model for alleviating homelessness that 
has gained significant traction in cities throughout North America in recent years. At its 
core, it is an approach that combines the services delivery model traditionally seen at a 
shelter or a care center with the dignity and freedom that comes from residing in one’s 
own dwelling. 
  
Page | 7  
 
Figure 2: The Supportive Housing Model 
 
 
As Figure 2 shows, the primary goal of supportive housing is to address risk factors that 
lead to homelessness, with a secondary effect of alleviating poverty through rent 
subsidization. A widely used definition comes from the Corporation for Supportive 
Housing (2005): 
 The unit is available to, and intended for, a person or family whose head of household is 
homeless, or at-risk of homelessness, and has multiple barriers to employment and 
housing stability, which might include mental illness, chemical dependency, and/or other 
disabling or chronic health conditions; 
 The tenant household ideally pays no more than 30% household income towards rent 
and utilities, and never pays more than 50% of income toward such housing expenses; 
 The tenant household has a lease (or similar form of occupancy agreement) with no 
limits on length of tenancy, as long as the terms and conditions of the lease or 
agreement are met; and 
 The unit’s operations are managed through an effective partnership among 
representatives of the project owner and/or sponsor, the property management agent, 
the supportive services providers, the relevant public agencies, and the tenants. 
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The success rate of supportive housing has generally been impressive wherever 
it has been introduced, and it is widely considered the most cost-effective means of 
reducing homelessness while giving clients a passage to reenter society. Results 
include reductions in hospital and emergency room visits, increases in employment 
rates for clients, and a reduction in symptoms of mental illness. A study in British 
Columbia further found that switching 100% to supportive housing as a means of 
homeless services provision would cost 67% of current provincial spending on the 
population, due to the many positive spillovers associated with this form of social policy. 
(Patterson, Somers, McIntosh, Shiell, & Frankish, 2008). United States numbers are 
equally impressive: a Pennsylvania study found that 95 percent of the costs incurred in 
developing and operating supportive housing are automatically recouped through 
savings on emergency rooms, criminal justice facilities, and emergency homeless 
services (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2010). Generally, supportive 
housing also shows high retention rates. Typically, 85 to 95 percent of residents remain 
long-term in their housing, which, on its face at least, is a somewhat surprising figure 
given that the populations typically served are among the clients most exposed to 
chronic and long-term homelessness (New York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance 
Abuse Services, 2010). 
Despite these statistics, supportive housing remains controversial, mostly 
because of resistance from neighborhoods where new developments are proposed. In 
New York City, Community Boards (which are somewhat comparable to Atlanta’s 
Neighborhood Planning Units) routinely raise opposition to proposed developments 
(Reicher, 2009), and a recent Canadian study showed widespread concern in 
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neighborhoods about supportive housing (Wellesley Institute, 2008). It should, however, 
also be noted that the same study found that, once the supportive development had 
existed for a while, opposition subsided and the new neighbors were generally very well 
accepted into the community. Some studies have even argued that supportive housing 
increases property values because it represents an investment in neighborhoods and 
reduces street homelessness (Supportive Housing Network of New York, 2006). 
Supportive Housing in Georgia 
Georgia is no exception to the general national trend of pervasive homelessness. 
In 2009, the Georgia Department of Community Affairs (2009) conducted a census 
which estimated that, at any given time, roughly 21,000 Georgians are homeless. As 
shown in Table 1, more than half (12,000) of these individuals are unsheltered or face 
loss of housing within a week. The majority of homeless individuals and families in 
Georgia are found in Metro Atlanta: Fulton County alone has over 6,000 homeless 
(sheltered and unsheltered), almost a third of the entire Georgia population. However, 
focusing on Atlanta understates the magnitude of the Georgia homeless challenge; 
because this part of the state experiences such concentrated homelessness it is also  
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Table 1: Homeless Census Counts for Georgia, 2009 
Housing Status Number of individuals 
Unsheltered 12,101 
Emergency Shelters and Transitional Housing 8,047 
Housing for Domestic Violence 947 
Total 21,095 
 
Source: Georgia Department of Community Affairs (2009) 
 
where much of the institutional and social services infrastructure is found. If one takes a 
look at rural Georgia and some of the smaller cities outside metropolitan Atlanta, it 
becomes clearer that homelessness is much more than a big-city problem in this state. 
For example, Jenkins County, halfway between Augusta and Savannah, has an 
estimated 444 individuals living without shelter at any given point in time – out of a 
population of only 9,000. Yet Jenkins County does not have even one single emergency 
or transitional bed and not a single unit of supportive housing (Georgia Department of 
Community Affairs, 2009). 
The Problem, Part I: Supportive Housing Need in Georgia 
No official estimate exists of the need for additional supportive housing units in 
the state of Georgia. However, with over 9,000 unsheltered homeless at any given point 
in time, it is clear that the shortfall is quite severe. For illustrative purposes only, a very 
rough estimate can be derived by comparing the current mix of temporary shelter beds, 
domestic violence shelter slots, and supportive housing units in the state. Table 2 
shows this distribution: 
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Table 2: Availability of Beds, State of Georgia, 2009 
Type of Housing Number of Beds % of total 
New units needed 
(author’s calculations) 
Emergency and Transitional Housing (excl. 
housing for victims of domestic violence) 
8,831 59.87% 7,245 
Housing for victims of domestic violence 1,312 8.89% 1,076 
Permanent Supportive Housing 4,608 31.24% 3,780 
Total 14,751 100% 12,101 
Data source: Georgia Department of Community Affairs (2009) 
If we assume that the current distribution of transitional vs. supportive units is the 
optimal mix of services for Georgia, it would take 3,780 additional units of supportive 
housing to fully address the current 12,000 unsheltered individuals in the state. The 
number, however, is likely much higher, due to a number of measurement challenges. 
First, it is quite difficult to estimate the unsheltered population accurately. Second, as 
mentioned earlier, supportive housing can effectively address individuals at risk of 
becoming homeless in addition to currently unsheltered persons. The at-risk population 
is also very hard to estimate, but the inclusion of this group obviously further increases 
the need for supportive units. Third, the shift towards supportive housing is fairly recent 
in homeless services. Thus, the current distribution of services most likely does not 
reflect future needs – rather, it reflects “institutional inertia” in the homeless services 
field; far more supportive housing than temporary shelter spots will need to be built in 
the future if current policy and treatment priorities are kept. Finally, the estimate reached 
above does not take into account population growth, fluctuations in the poverty rate, etc. 
Georgia will likely continue to grow at a rather rapid pace in the coming years; a 
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continuing investment in supportive housing for those left behind by this growth will be 
needed. 
The Problem, Part 2: Georgia Supportive Housing Funding 
As illustrated above, Georgia is experiencing a sizable homelessness problem as 
well as a significant shortage of both shelter beds and supportive housing units. 
Moreover, its services infrastructure is concentrated in and around the city of Atlanta, 
while its rural, small town and non-major cities have only limited service capacity. It 
stands to reason that the only reasonable way to solve this issue would be a concerted 
effort by the state government, since smaller cities and rural counties would find it 
difficult to finance such endeavors by themselves. Unfortunately, the Department of 
Community Affairs has very few resources to support the development of supportive 
housing. 
The only major source of funding for supportive housing development provided 
by the state of Georgia is the Permanent Supportive Housing Program. In its latest 
Notice of Funding Availability, DCA makes available $6,700,000 in federal HOME funds, 
and $500,000 from the state Housing Trust Fund for the Homeless. This can be 
combined with other sources, but obviously this is inadequate compared to the 
significant need present in this state (Georgia Department of Community Affairs, 2009). 
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Criteria for Evaluating Policy Alternatives 
In light of the funding crisis for supportive housing in Georgia, I have examined 
four innovative state policies that wholly or in part have as their purpose to fund this 
endeavor. A number of evaluation criteria had to be established to ascertain the 
strengths, weaknesses and potential applicability to the needs and conditions in 
Georgia of each of these approaches. I identify the following criteria for evaluation of a 
program designed to expand the amount of supportive housing in Georgia: 
1. Does the program reflect a sober assessment of need for supportive housing in the 
state, including the spatial distribution of this demand? 
2. Do benchmarks exist for supportive housing development, procurement or acquisition 
that can conceivably be reached within a reasonable time frame? This time frame should 
also be explicitly stated. 
3. Does the policy develop and execute a funding mechanism that can conceivably and 
reliably ensure that the set goals will be reached within the stated time frame? The 
funding mechanism should also provide at least a minimum of operational support for 
the units created under the policy. 
4. Are policies and procedures included that ensure the developed, acquired or procured 
supportive housing lives up to the following standards? 
a. Supportive housing can take several forms: scattered-site or congregate; new 
development or rehabilitation. The program should not limit the ways in which 
supportive housing can be procured for the benefit of at-risk individuals. 
b. Supportive housing should not be concentrated. Because of the nature of 
supportive housing, residents are often viewed with skepticism, fear, or disdain 
by neighbors, especially early on as people have yet to get used to their 
presence. Therefore, regular affordable housing or market rate units should be 
mixed in with supportive units to lessen this stigma. 
c. Transit remains a very important source of mobility for people with a tenuous 
foothold in society and the labor market, such as supportive housing residents. It 
should therefore be a goal of the program to ensure access to transit services for 
supportive housing residents. 
d. As illustrated earlier, there are many factors that can contribute to the risk of 
homelessness. In order to make supportive housing most effective, these risk 
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factors must be addressed in a professional and comprehensive manner – i.e. 
there should be supportive housing available that specifically targets individuals 
according to their risk factor “combination.” Additionally, the state should not limit 
the number of risk factors it seeks to address, so long as they are reasonably 
justified by the professionals who assist supportive housing residents. 
e. The geographic extent of the program is also important. As referenced earlier, 
Georgia is experiencing a severe shortage of homeless services in rural areas, 
and programs that specifically target rural or small jurisdictions could therefore 
work more effectively to address this issue. 
f. An important criterion for evaluation will be the accountability and ease of 
performance measurement provided by the program structure. Concrete goals 
for provision of housing are only part of this, and other measures – planned or 
unplanned – that increase transparency would add to the robustness of a policy. 
g. Will neighborhood approval be part of the development process? It may be 
controversial to include this measure as an evaluation criterion, but NIMBY is 
often cited as one of the most severe obstacles to supportive housing 
development, so from a perspective of delivering as much housing as needed at 
a reasonable cost and maximum efficiency, neighborhood approval is an 
unequivocal negative. 
5. Finally, what is the political feasibility of the program in a conservative, small-
government, Southern state such as Georgia? 
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Policy Alternatives 
I now consider four alternative state supportive housing policies, in the context of 
potential adoption in Georgia, with particular attention to the New York/New York III 
Agreement. State policies in North Carolina, Connecticut and California will also be 
considered and evaluated according to the criteria outlined above. 
Alternative 1: New York/New York III Agreement 
The New York/New York III Agreement was launched in 2006 as the third 
installment of an ongoing collaborative effort between the state of New York and its 
largest city. The two first agreements (named New York/New York I and II) were signed 
in 1990 and 1999, respectively. Both had been quite successful in delivering a 
combined 5,000 units of supportive housing in a city that suffers from one of the most 
serious homeless problems of any in the United States (New York City Independent 
Budget Office, 2010). NY/NY III calls for the development of 9,000 units of permanent 
supportive housing within 10 years from the inception of the agreement. These units are 
divided into two “spatial” types and a number of primary service categories: 
Of the proposed units 2,750 are scheduled to be of the “scattered-site” type, in 
which a nonprofit service provider negotiates a lease for an apartment from a (typically 
private-sector) landlord. The leaseholder may be the supportive services client, and the 
service organization provides him or her with a substantial monthly rent subsidy (often 
the difference between rental cost and 30% of the tenant’s income) to ensure 
affordability. Case managers then deliver services via either home visits or group 
counseling at an accessible location. 
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Congregate units are, in the NY/NY III definition, entire buildings devoted to 
supportive housing, in which tenants share bathrooms, kitchens and gathering rooms, 
but retain their own bedrooms. In some cases the accommodations are a bit more 
spacious and tenants have their own actual apartments with private kitchens and 
bathrooms. Congregate facilities can have non-supportive units mixed in with supportive 
ones, and are very often new construction or substantial rehabilitation of dilapidated 
structures, a feature that makes them much more expensive to deliver than scattered-
site supportive housing. Of the NY/NY III units, 6,250 must be of this variety. In addition 
to the distinction between scattered-site and congregate units, NY/NY III also stipulates 
how many units must be targeted to each of several at-risk populations. Figure 3 shows 
the distribution between these categories. 
One of the interesting aspects of NY/NY III is that implementation is spread 
among several agencies, typically according to which service category an agency is 
responsible for. It is not entirely clear whether this is a deliberate result of the program 
design or a bow to political considerations, but the importance of this should not be 
underestimated. A 2009 evaluation of NY/NY III by the Corporation for Supportive 
Housing illustrates nicely how the program structure can allow for easy accountability 
and evaluation: capital commitments are divided between four agencies: the New York 
City Department of Housing Preservation and Development and three state entities: the 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, the Office of Temporary and Disability 
Assistance (OTDA), and the Office of Mental Health (OMH). The responsibilities are   
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Figure 3: Distribution of responsibilities by agency: NY/NY III Agreement 
Source: NYC Independent Budget Office (2010), page 4. 
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organized topically (OTDA funds supportive housing for the disabled, and OMH for the 
mentally ill), which allows each agency to fully take advantage of their expertise in 
designing funding and service provision. This structure also allows for a form of 
competition because advocates, media and the general public can compare agencies 
against their benchmarks as well as against each other (Corporation for Supportive 
Housing, 2009). 
The implementing agencies use a variety of sources to implement what 
essentially amounts to an unfunded mandate from the state and the city of New York. 
Each agency has access to a certain amount of Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
funding along with budget allocations from the state or city, depending on the type of 
agency. Importantly, the NY/NY III agreement does not contain any specific additional 
funding mechanisms – it is supposed to be financed through the reallocation of already-
existing revenue sources (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2010). 
Alternative 2: Connecticut’s Next Steps 
When the Connecticut Pilots program was introduced in 2002 it was quickly 
recognized as being one of the most innovative and successful supportive housing 
initiatives ever launched by a state government. Among many other accolades it won an 
“Innovations in American Government” from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of 
Government (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006). 
The heir to Pilots is Next Steps, which was authorized in 2006 with the expressed 
goal of creating 500 units of supportive housing throughout the state. Development 
funding (construction and permanent loan) is provided by the Connecticut Housing 
Finance Authority, which is permitted by the state legislature to issue 501(c)(3) tax 
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exempt bonds to pay for the housing. The state pays the interest to bondholders, which 
makes this program an incredibly powerful subsidy for development. The recipient will 
agree to be bound by a restrictive covenant for 30 years in exchange for funding. The 
principal and interest on the permanent loan are only due upon the expiration of the 
restrictive covenant, or upon sale of the property. If the recipient agrees to be bound for 
another 30 years at the end of the first covenant, the entire liability will be forgiven. For 
the latest RFP, issued in 2008, $35 million was made available by the legislature. Other 
state agencies guarantee the operational funding in the amount of $7,000/year for 
young adults, $9,500 for adults, and $13,500 for families. Rental assistance is also 
available for residents, either from the federal Rental Assistance Program or in the form 
of project-based vouchers (Connecticut Interagency Committee for Supportive Housing, 
2008). 
All agencies supported by Next Steps must be 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations 
with prior experience in housing development. Funding is available for both new 
construction and rehabilitation of current structures. In order to ensure that 
developments mix supportive and non-supportive units, the program operates with a 
number of thresholds: 
 Developments with less than 12 units must have 25% or more supportive units, 
up to 100%. 
 More than 12, less than 20: 30-60% of units must be supportive housing. 
 Over 20 units, 30-50% of units must be supportive. 
 
For all developments, priority is given to those who maximize the “mixing” of non-
supportive and supportive units. This is expressly done to reduce stigma. All units must 
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be affordable (for individuals earning less than 100% of AMI) and should not charge 
more than 30% of income in rent. Transit accessibility is also a major priority: uniquely 
among the programs examined in this analysis, Next Steps outright requires that 
subsidized projects be accessible to public transportation. If this is not immediately 
available, the provider must provide a van service that connects residents to transit 
(Connecticut Interagency Committee for Supportive Housing, 2008). 
Next Steps applies a very broad definition to its eligibility criteria. For example, this is 
the definition from the latest RFP of what constitutes a “special needs” family: 
 
“Family with special needs” means one or more adults with at least one dependent 
child aged fourteen (14) or younger, and:  
a. that has been repeatedly homeless;  
b. that meets the eligibility criteria under the Federal Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (“TANF”) Program but has become ineligible or are at risk of 
ineligibility for TANF cash assistance due to time limits;  
c. may have multiple barriers to housing stability (e.g., head of household with 
cognitive limitations, history of trauma, mental illness and/or chemical 
dependency);  
d. that may be presently involved in the DCF system; and  
e. who have incomes at or below 50% of AMI at the time of entering housing.” 
(Connecticut Interagency Committee for Supportive Housing, 2008) 
 
Similar definitions exist for adult individuals and youth with special needs. Units 
targeting different types of special needs may be included within the same 
development. Importantly, priority is given to individuals or families that have 
experienced chronic homelessness (Connecticut Interagency Committee for Supportive 
Housing, 2008). 
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Alternative 3: California’s Mental Health Services Act 
In 2004, California voters approved Proposition 63, which established the Mental 
Health Services Act (MHSA). The Act was an attempt by mental health advocates to 
develop a continuous source of funding for services targeted towards mentally ill 
Californians. Funding comes from a 1% tax on all personal incomes over $1 million in 
the state. A portion of this money is used to fund supportive housing for the mentally ill, 
with priority going to those who are chronically homeless in addition to their mental 
illness.  According to MHSA the amount for acquisition and development cannot exceed 
$74 million annually, out of a projected $683 million in FY 2006. Additionally, $40 million 
annually is provided for operation of supportive housing. 8% of funding is set aside for 
small counties, which also get to waive certain procedures and conditions that larger 
jurisdictions must follow. The ultimate goal is that this funding will deliver 10,000 units of 
supportive housing throughout the state of California. No specific year has been 
provided for when the state is expected to reach this benchmark (California Housing 
Finance Agency, 2007). 
The basic unit of government responsible for applying for MHSA funding is a 
county health department. Any supportive housing development that is funded by 
MHSA must be consistent with the county’s Three Year Program and Expenditure Plan 
in order to ensure that it is compatible with local goals. Funding is limited in several 
ways. First, the MHSA uses a formula model to determine how much each county in 
California receives every year. Second, there are funding limits placed on developments 
(as per the number of units targeting MHSA-eligible individuals), and on the units 
themselves (no unit can receive more than $100,000 in funding).The funding is provided 
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as a low-interest loan to the developer, who must be a nonprofit organization or a 
government-affiliated corporation (California Housing Finance Agency, 2007). Income 
restrictions are also placed on potential residents: units must be targeted to individuals 
earning less than 50% of AMI, but the state prioritizes developments that limit residence 
to those earning less than 30% of AMI as well as only charging 30% of income as rent 
(California Housing Finance Agency, 2007). 
Alternative 4: North Carolina Qualified Allocation Plan Set-Aside 
North Carolina has several means to fund supportive housing development, but 
the most important is the way the state administrates its Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) allocation from the federal government. North Carolina’s Qualified 
Allocation Plan (the plan that it must prepare to justify its allocation of LIHTCs) 
stipulates that any LIHTC-funded development in the state must include at least 10% 
supportive housing for the disabled or homeless, or at least 5 units regardless of size. 
There is no specific goal set for this program, which is not too surprising since the total 
annual allocation of LIHTC funding (and thereby the maximum annual set-aside) is 
determined by the federal government. While there is no built-in funding for operations 
or services, recipients are required to show that they have entered an agreement with a 
funded provider to deliver supportive services in set-aside units. There is no specific 
requirement to provide access to transit or other community amenities, but LIHTC 
recipients must submit a document in which they detail how the project will meet these 
needs (North Carolina Housing Finance Authority, 2009). 
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Evaluation of the Alternatives 
Table 3 compares the four state policy alternatives according to the established 
evaluation criteria. In order to ease readability and comparability I color-coded each 
evaluation criterion, wherever applicable. A green cell means this criterion is a positive 
for the policy, red means negative, and yellow means positive, but with reservations. In 
the following narrative, I will briefly outline the strengths and weaknesses of each policy 
on all criteria other than political feasibility. I then compare the political feasibility of the 
four alternatives. 
Table 3: The Alternatives-Criteria Matrix for State Supportive Housing Policies
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Strengths and Weaknesses of New York/New York III Agreement 
The New York/New York III Agreement is clearly a serious policy initiative. All available 
literature, along with the fact that the first two agreements were highly successful, points 
towards a very significant investment in supportive housing in New York City. The goals 
outlined by NY/NY III are undoubtedly part and parcel of this success: they provide a 
tangible benchmark that agencies and advocates alike can measure against. It is also a 
major strength that the agreement specifically identifies the issue of homelessness as 
its major policy target, and supportive housing as its only response. This heightens 
accountability and provides clarity in mission for agencies in charge of implementing its 
provisions. Clarity is further enhanced by the fact that responsibilities of each 
participating agency (including the security that operations funding will be provided for 
all units developed) are written and officially agreed upon by the governor and mayor.
 NY/NY III is not without problems, however. Funding is not specifically provided 
in the agreement, and agencies are forced to find the means to achieve their mandate 
by moving funding from regular affordable housing provision to supportive housing. In 
addition to lowering the availability of non-supportive affordable units in a city with a 
severe housing affordability problem, this may also have the effect of pitting 
constituencies within the housing advocacy community against each other. While the 
first two agreements reached their goals, NY/NY III may indeed have problems with 
reaching its goals due to the lack of attached funding: according to a recent analysis by 
the Corporation for Supportive Housing, all four agencies funding development are 
behind their anticipated 2010 position, especially for the capital-intensive congregate 
facilities (Corporation for Supportive Housing, 2009). Another issue with NY/NY III is the 
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lack of incentives for mixing non-supportive and supportive units. While evidence from 
one major Brooklyn provider shows that this type of mixed-“use” is not unheard of, and 
is widely recognized as best practice (CAMBA, Inc., 2008), it would certainly have made 
for a stronger policy if mixing had been explicitly mandated or incentivized in the 
agreement. Mixing incentives or mandates would have been especially helpful in 
dealing with the next weakness of NY/NY III: its reliance on neighborhood approval. 
While this is not explicitly part of the agreement (it is a separate New York City 
ordinance that mandates Community Board review of proposed supportive housing 
projects), it is still a condition that all supportive housing development must operate 
under in New York City. According to the Independent Budget Office of New York City, 
this restriction is likely a major cause of the significant delays experienced in bringing 
new construction on line (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2010). Clearly, 
policies that circumvent NIMBY issues should be recommended. NY/NY III is not one of 
them. 
Strenghts and Weaknesses of Connecticut’s Next Steps 
Of the three programs evaluated in addition to NY/NY III, Next Steps is clearly 
the most impressive: it has unambiguous goals, is clearly defined as a homelessness 
alleviation program and specifically deals with supportive housing. State agencies are 
funding operations of new units directly, and the transit access and mixing requirements 
are extremely strong and progressive. Finally, the subsidies given to developers are 
both very strong and long-lasting (given the robust incentive to keep units in the 
supportive housing stock for 60 years). A subsidy of this size is not always justified in 
housing development, but in the case of supportive housing the 95% direct recoupment 
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of invested dollars simply speaks for itself. There are only minor weaknesses to this 
program: it does not utilize the opportunity to drive competition and accountability 
through assigning implementation to multiple agencies, and the funding is somewhat 
tenuous given that the CHFA is dependent upon annual state budget allocations, rather 
than an earmarked funding stream. Finally, the goal is clear, but the timeline is not. This 
may not be a problem with the current incarnation of Next Steps (CHFA states that the 
program is on target to reach the 500 units in this RFP cycle), it may become an issue if 
funding is ever compromised, because the lack of a timeline for goal completion 
removes an incentive to keep the program funded in the short term. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of California’s MHSA 
The MHSA in California is different from the other programs profiled – positively 
as well as negatively. It is funded via a tax on income, which improves long-term 
stability – a clear strength. Its set-asides for small jurisdictions (and the waiver of certain 
procedures and requirements that accompanies the set-aside) makes it a very attractive 
model for states with supportive housing needs in rural areas and small cities with little 
administrative infrastructure. The policy also has clear weaknesses: first, it is not 
supportive housing-specific, and the supportive housing it funds is only available to 
those with diagnosed mental illnesses. This feature is not only inequitable towards 
those homeless who are not mentally ill; it also poses the danger of crowding out state 
investment into other forms of supportive housing in California. The lack of incentives 
for transit access in a state as expensive as California is also a major drawback. 
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Strengths and Weaknesses of North Carolina’s QAP Set-Aside 
The North Carolina policy benefits from being very simple in design as well as in 
implementation. As discussed earlier, the lack of concrete goals may not be too much of 
a problem given the continuous nature of the federal LIHTC program, which ensures a 
constant stream of new units added to the stock. Additionally, other North Carolina 
supportive housing programs that have specific goals utilize the QAP set-aside to reach 
their objectives. The LIHTC link also provides a second advantage to the program 
because it more or less “builds in” mixing of supportive with non-supportive units. 
However, the reliance of the policy on this tax credit may be an issue for two 
reasons. First, because it means that supportive housing development to an extent will 
fluctuate with the market for tax credits. And second, because the tax credit program 
only binds developers for 15-30 years. While the Connecticut program also has this 
feature, this state has built in very strong incentives to keep units within the supportive 
housing stock for a much longer time. The North Carolina program also does not 
provide a strong enough incentive for developers to ensure transit accessibility to 
projects. A final weakness is the lack of a specific link between development and 
operations funding: while the QAP targeting process requires that developers have 
funding secured, the state does not specifically provide it as part of this program. 
Political Feasibility in Georgia 
Regardless of their merits, the four policies hold very different prospects for 
outright adoption in Georgia. I view NY/NY III as having “medium” feasibility primarily 
due to its source (a northern state program might not have much persuasive power in 
Georgia). However, the best argument for the feasibility of the agreement is also its 
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greatest weakness: the lack of dedicated funding. While the state and city of New York 
do fund the program via direct budget appropriations, federal LIHTC and HOME 
resources also play a major role – a feature that makes the program attractive to any 
state government leery of raising spending. 
The North Carolina model would be extremely applicable to a Georgia context. 
First, it stems from a neighboring, politically right-of-center state, which makes it much 
easier to advocate for with decision makers here. Second, the funding for supportive 
housing is taken from federal appropriations that would be coming to the state anyway, 
making it expense-neutral. This reliance on federal funds can be beneficial in another 
sense: taking funding from “conventional” affordable housing (such as LIHTC) and 
shifting it towards population groups deemed more “deserving” might make such a 
program desirable even for people ideologically opposed to government housing 
provision.  
California’s MHSA would stand no chance of implementation as-is in Georgia. 
While voters in this state are not completely beyond taxing themselves to pay for 
services, conservative aversion to income taxes renders any idea to raise those dead 
on arrival. Frankly, the public policy merits of exclusively taxing the very wealthy to pay 
for broad-based public services should also be in debate, so the low feasibility rating of 
this program might not be entirely “negative.” 
The Connecticut model could be made to work in Georgia, but it might require 
stripping it of some of its most compelling components: while state bond financing could 
be implemented here, I find it unlikely that Georgia decision makers would be able to 
offer the same robust subsidy and favorable terms found in Connecticut (one of the 
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primary distinctions between Next Steps and the North Carolina subsidy model). Hence, 
I have given the Next Steps program a “low” feasibility rating. 
Lessons for Georgia 
Should the state government of Georgia decide to get more involved in 
supportive housing delivery than its current quite limited role, it could learn plenty from 
the four exampled analyzed in this report. In this section, I will briefly describe a 
potential framework for introducing a NY/NY III-style policy to Georgia. 
The Basis 
Despite its shortcomings, I believe that NY/NY III is an extremely useful basis for 
any state-funded supportive housing policy: it clearly outlines goals, shares 
responsibility across jurisdictional levels, and firmly commits the state government to a 
specific task and timeline. Devoting responsibility for funding risk-factor specific housing 
to the agencies that cover these risk factors in the general population is also a very 
compelling tactic that can enhance accountability as well as ensure maximum relevance 
for target populations. The concept of pairing operational and development funding 
within the same program is simply good public policy and should be carried over into 
any initiative inspired by this agreement. 
The Modifications 
Despite its obvious strengths and applicability to a Georgia context, some 
features of NY/NY III would need to be tweaked to make it work at a state level, to 
address some of its weaknesses, and make it more politically feasible in the political 
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climate of Georgia. First, the agreement is currently only in place in New York City. No 
other such agreement exists for any other cities in New York State. This does not mean 
that the general idea of a state/local agreement to fund supportive housing bears no 
relevance outside the New York City context. Georgia might consider using its regional 
planning agencies to administer the local side of development, especially in regions 
where individual counties may not have the administrative capacity to implement their 
responsibilities. The state should conduct a needs assessment for each county in 
Georgia, and assign a number and timeline for completion of all supportive housing 
units to meet the assessed need. If locally-based funding is necessary, the model used 
in the recently passed Georgia transportation bill, where regions opt into a penny sales 
tax (in the case of supportive housing, a fraction-of-penny sales tax would be more 
relevant) might be useful. The incentive for opting in would be funding support from the 
state, and a way out of the homelessness problem sapping locally-funded emergency 
and criminal justice resources. 
State funding could either be provided using the Connecticut model (unlikely, due 
to political feasibility concerns), or via a combination of other incentives and a Qualified 
Allocation Plan set-aside such as the one used in North Carolina. Whichever funding 
model is used, it is imperative that the Connecticut emphasis on unit mixing is included 
in the considerations, as this will significantly lower stigma concerns in areas that may 
not be particularly accepting of having supportive housing units as neighbors. 
Furthermore, a version of California’s small-county set-aside and easing of restrictions 
should be included to make sure rural areas are served. 
Page | 31  
 
The political feasibility of the above structure would be fairly high, except if local opt-in is 
required to trigger any spending on supportive housing. As mentioned earlier, heavy 
utilization of federal funding will make a policy more attractive, as may shifting funds 
from conventional affordable housing towards the supportive kind. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have examined four state policies potential models for supportive 
housing development support in the state of Georgia. Generally, their applicability to this 
state is quite high, and with a few modifications a very strong policy could be 
constructed that would: 
 Significantly improve the state’s role in supportive housing development; 
 Ensure a more equitable distribution of homeless services resources according 
to need; 
 Save local and state government considerable money because of savings on 
emergency facilities and the criminal justice system; and 
 Bring thousands of marginalized Georgians back into the mainstream of society, 
where they may lead more productive, happier and healthier lives for the benefit 
of society at large. 
 
Only a minority of states offer significant funding for this type of social policy. A 
more aggressive approach could allow Georgia to be considered an innovator in this 
field, especially if a significant solution can be devised for rural homelessness, which is 
a concern nationwide. Time will tell whether Georgia will get ahead of the curve on 
supportive housing, but a “Georgia Agreement” based on a modified NY/NY III would be 
a good place to start.  
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